Partial Protection From Self-Incrimination in Military Justice by Bartlett, Gilbert A.
William & Mary Law Review
Volume 9 | Issue 3 Article 13
Partial Protection From Self-Incrimination in
Military Justice
Gilbert A. Bartlett
Copyright c 1968 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr
Repository Citation
Gilbert A. Bartlett, Partial Protection From Self-Incrimination in Military Justice, 9 Wm. & Mary L. Rev.
844 (1968), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol9/iss3/13
PARTIAL PROTECTION FROM SELF-INCRIMINATION
IN MILITARY JUSTICE
On May 1, 1966, Airman Third Class Michael Tempia was arrested
on suspicion of committing a violation of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice' at Dover Air Force Base. He was brought before an investi-
gator of the Office of Special Investigations and, prior to interrogation,
was warned that he had the right to remain silent and that he could
consult with legal counsel. Tempia indicated that he desired counsel
and the interview was terminated. Two days later Tempia again was
called to appear at the OSI office and again was advised of his rights.
An interview was set up by the investigator with the Base Staff Judge
Advocate and Tempia was sent to that office. During the ensuing dis-
cussion that officer, a trained lawyer, informed Tempia that a lawyer-
client relationship could not exist between the two since it would dis-
qualify the officer from later acting in his capacity as the Staff Judge
Advocate. The lawyer did advise Tempia of his right to remain silent
and that the suspect could retain civilian counsel during the investiga-
tion, but that a military lawyer would not be made available for the
interrogation. Tempia acknowledged his understanding of his right of
silence by signing a written form. On his return to the OSI office
Tempia stated that "They didn't do me no good." He was again advised
of his right of silence but proceeded to make a confession of his role in
the offense.
Tempia's general court-martial took place on July 14, 1966, the day
after Miranda v. Arizone was decided by the Supreme Court. During
the trial, defense counsel sought to exclude the confession on the
grounds that it was obtained without the presence of a lawyer as re-
quired by the Supreme Court. The motion was overruled and Tempia
was found guilty. A board of review sustained the findings but the case
was certified to the United States Court of Military Appeals by the
Judge Advocate General, United States Air Force, on the issue of the
applicability of Miranda to the administration of military justice.3
On April 25, 1967, the Court of Military Appeals reversed the convic-
tion, thereby requiring the government to provide military personnel
1. Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1964 ed.).
2. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3. The facts of the case are as stated in the majority opinion of Judge Ferguson.
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with trained legal counsel, regardless of ability to retain civilian counsel,
during interrogations.4
Through its decision the Court of Military Appeals has brought into
question the effectiveness of military counsel-a term denoting officers
untrained in the law-appearing for the defense before military tribunals.
At present, trained legal counsel are required to represent the defendant
only before general courts-martial or where the trial counsel is a quali-
fied lawyerY The resultant problem can be illustrated by the corollary
of a statement in the Miranda opinion: For the court to protect the right
of silence during interrogation and not protect that right at an equally
critical stage of the adversary proceedings-the trial-is to offer no pro-
tection at all.6 This discussion will attempt to point out the contradictions
of this example of judicial legislation as it affects the administration of
military justice.
EvoLu TIO OF THE AMERICAN MILITARY JUSTICE SYSTEM
Before one can appreciate the effect that Tempia may have on the
administration of military justice, it is useful to understand the term
"military counsel" in an historical context. While not extensive, the fol-
lowing outline of the evolution of this concept will illustrate the tradi-
tions which the present decision seeks to overcome.7
As a result of the European experience, there was great concern in
the young American nation over the presence of a standing army and
its possible influence over the government.' As an outgrowth of this
concern, the military was placed under the regulatory control of Con-
gress9 and the legislation which provided for the government of the
Army was given only passing attention. The Continental Congress,
whose members were largely responsible for the later adoption of the
4. United States v. Tempia, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 629. 37 C.M.R. 249 (1967).
5. Note 21 infra.
6. 384 U.S. at 477.
7. See Judge Kilday's majority opinion in United States v. Culp, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 199,
33 C.M.R. 411 (1963); Wiener, Courts-Martial and the Bill of Rights: The Original
Practice, 72 HARv. L. REv. 1 and 266 (1958); Henderson, Courts-Martial and the Con-
stitution: The Original Understanding, 71 HARv. L. REv. 293 (1957).
8. This position resulted in Alexander Hamilton's strong reply in favor of a national
armed force in The Federalist. The Federalist No.'s. 23-26 (Hamilton).
9. "Congress shall have the Power ... To raise and support Armies, but no Appro-
priation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years .... To
make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces." U.S.
CoNsr. art. 1, § 8.
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Bill of Rights, enacted substantially the same procedures for the admin-
istration of military justice as were then in force in the British Army.1
These procedures failed to recognize that the accused was an interested
party before a court-martial, or that he might possess certain rights
which required protection." It is significant to note that when the
accused did receive legislative recognition ten years later, it was to ex-
tend to him some protection for his freedom from involuntary self-
incrimination.' 2 Here, it should be noted that the accused did not receive
his protection from an attorney but from the military judge advocate,
who retained the primary duty of prosecuting the case for the govern-
ment." This legislation seems to have satisfied Congress for the same
procedure was reenacted without change as late as 1873.14
As the system of military jurisprudence evolved, the Judge Advocate
became firmly established as the proper instrument for protecting the
accused before a court martial. The Supreme Court had occasion to
note this situation, and its approval of the system can be inferred from
that body's statement that military courts-martial operate independently
of the judicial powers of the United States as defined by the Constitu-
tion", and, further, that "military law is itself due process." "I Con-
10. "There was extant one system of articles of war, which had carried two empires
to the helm of command, the Roman and the British, for the British Articles of War
were only a literal translation of the Roman .... I was therefore for reporting the
British Articles totidum verbis... The British Articles were accordingly reported."
3 ADAMS, WORKS Op JoHN ADAMS 93 (1850), quoted in Morgan, The Background of
the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 28 MIL. L. REv. 17 at 18 (1965).
11. The following section of the early Articles of War points out the singular at-
tention given the prosecution to the exclusion of the interests of the accused. There
was no comparable section assigning representation for the accused. "The judge-advo-
cate general, or some person deputed by him, shall prosecute in the name of the United
States of America." 5 Journals of the Continental Congress § XIV, art. 3 at 801 (1776).
12. "The judge-advocate, or some person deputed by him, or by the general or
officer commanding the Army, detachment, or garrison, shall prosecute in the name of
the United States, but shall so far consider himself as counsel for the prisoner, after
the said prisoner shall have made his plea, as to object to any leading question to any
of the witnesses, or any question to the prisoner, the answer to which might tend to
criminate himself." Act of April 10, ch. XX, art. 69, 2 Star. 367 (1806).
13. "Plainly, the foregoing [art. 69 of 1806] reflects the Blackstonian common law
notion of the judge as counsel for the prisoner, rather than the sixteenth amendment's
guarantee of the assistance of counsel." Wiener, supra note 7 at 22.
14. Articles of War, ch. 5, § 1342 art. 90, 18 Stat. 238 (1873).
15. "These provisions [U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8] show that Congress has the power
to provide for the trial and punishment of military and naval offenses in the manner
then and now practiced by civilized nations; and that the power to do so is given
without any connection between it and the 3rd article of the Constitution defining the
judicial power of the United States; indeed that the two powers are entirely inde-
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temporary writers observed that, although some judge advocates would
allow counsel to appeal in the capacity of amicus curiae for the ac-
cused, the presence of counsel was at all times a privilege rather than a
right of the "prisoner." ' 7
In 1916 legislation was enacted which expressly granted to an accused
before a military tribunal the right to be represented by counsel.' 8 If
the accused desired counsel the court could not deny him that right; if
he could not afford counsel the judge advocate retained the responsi-
bility of protecting the accused from over-zealous prosecution. In 1920
a further change in the Articles of War granted the military accused
the right to be represented by appointed military counsel if he was
unable to retain civilian counsel.'9 Since military officers traditionally
were qualified to appear before, or be appointed to, military tribunals
by authority of their commission, the term "appointed military counsel"
was taken to mean any military officer regardless of his level of legal
training.20 It can be seen that the duty of appointed counsel was to act
as a foil for excessive pressure from the prosecution rather than to test
aggressively the elements of the prosecution's case.
Following World War II, Congress, as part of a drive to unify the
armed forces, conducted extensive studies of the status of military
justice; the result is the present Uniform Code of Military Justice.2'
From this congressional reappraisal certain definitive requirements are
placed on the armed forces which increase the accused's protection
from involuntary self-incrimination during a court-martial. One of the
results of the legislation is to establish the unqualified right of the ac-
pendent of each other." Dynes v. Hoover, 61 US. (20 How.) 65 at 79 (1858); see also
Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953).
16. Reaves v. Ainsworth, 219 U.S. 296 at 304 (1911).
17. "Courts-martial are particularly guarded in adhering to the custom which ob-
tains, of resisting every attempt on the part of counsel to address them; a lawyer is not
recognized by a Court-Martial, though his presence is tolerated, as a friend of the
prisoner, to assist him by advice in preparing questions for witnesses, in taking notes
and shaping his defense." MAcocm, THE PRAcTIcE OF COURTS-MA TIAL, § 93 at 47 (1840)
quoted in Wiener, supra note 7 at 38.
18. Act of June 3, 1916, ch. 418, 1342, art. 17, 39 Stat. 650.
19. Act of June 4, 1920, ch. 227, 3 52, art. 17, 41 Stat. 787.
20. "From the earliest days of our military establishment, all officers of the military
have been recognized as qualified to serve as counsel before courts-martial. Ability to
discharge duties on courts-martial, consonant with his rank, has always been considered
as one of the qualifications of a military officer." United States v. Culp, 14 U.S.C.M.A.
199 at 203, 33 C.M.R. 411 at 418 (1963).
21. Uniform Code of Military Justice, hereafter cited as UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. H3 801-
940 (1964) ed.).
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cused appearing before a general court-martial to have trained legal
counsel appointed for his defense. 2 A second element puts the legal
qualifications of counsel for the accused before inferior courts-martial
in parity with the qualifications of the trial counsel.2 3 An examination
of the statute indicates that Congress has retained the view that military
officers are qualified to appear in the capacity of counsel before military
courts so long as the court before which they appear lacks the authority
to try certain crimes2  and impose certain punishments. 5
In its effort to provide adequate protection for the accused's right to
remain free from involuntary self-incrimination, Congress established
certain procedural standards which serve to define this basic principle.
Compiled in Article 3126 of the Code, these provisions require the gov-
ernment to recognize and respect the accused's right to silence during
the proceedings against him. "1 Specifically, the Article requires that no
22. UCMJ art. 27 (b), 10 U.S.C. § 827 (b) (1964 ed.) "Trial counsel or defense
counsel detailed for a general court-martial-
(1) must be a judge advocate of the Army or Air Force, or a law specialist of the
Navy or Coast Guard, who is a graduate of an accredited law school or is a member of
the bar of a Federal court or of the highest court of a State; or must be a member of
the bar of a Federal court or of the highest court of a State; and
(2) must be certified as competent to perform such duties by the Judge Advocate
General of the armed force of which he is a member."
23. UCMJ art. 27 (c), 10 U.S.C. § 827 (c) (1964 ed.) "In the case of a special court-
martial-
(1) if the trial counsel is qualified to act as counsel before a general court-martial,
the defense counsel detailed by the convening authority must be a person similarly
qualified; and
(2) if the trial counsel is a judge advocate, or a law specialist, or a member of the
bar of a Federal court or of the highest court of a State, the defense counsel detailed
by the convening authority must be one of the foregoing."
24. UCMJ art. 19, 10 U.S.C. S 819 (1964 ed.) "[S]pecial courts-martial have jurisdic-
tion to try persons subject to this chapter for any noncapital offense made punishable
by this chapter and, under such regulations as the President may prescribe, for capital
offenses."
25. UCMJ art. 19, 10 U.S.C. § 819 (1964 ed.) "Special courts-martial may, under such
limitations as the President may prescribe, adjudge any punishment nor forbidden by
this chapter except death, dishonorable discharge, dismissal, confinement for more than
six months, hard labor without confinement for more than three months, forfeiture of
pay exceeding two-thirds pay per month, or forfeiture of pay for more than six
months. A bad conduct discharge may not be adjudged unless a complete record of the
proceedings and testimony before the court has been made."
26. UCMJ art. 31, 10 U.S.C. § 231 (1964 ed.).
27. For judicial interpretation of the congressional intent and of the proper applica-
tion of article 31 see United States v. Welch, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 402, 3 C.M.R. 136 (1952);
United States v. Josey, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 767, 14 C.M.R. 185 (1954); United States v. John-
son, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 795, 19 C.M.R. 91 (1955); United States v. Williams, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 443,
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member of the military shall compel another to make self-incriminating
statements.28 Before the suspect can be interrogated he must be warned
of the crime he is suspected of having committed, of his right to re-
main silent, and that if he does speak, what he says may be used in a
subsequent trial by court-martial.2 If the government succeeds in ob-
taining a statement in violation of these provisions, that statement is
inadmissible in any subsequent trial,30 and the persons who obtained the
statement, either through coercion or an unlawful inducement, have
themselves violated the Code."' Through the provisions of the Manual
for Courts-Martial 3 2 the procedural effects of the Article are extended
to protect the accused through the exclusion of confessions illegally
obtainedm and also by the continued protection of the accused's rights
while testifying.-s
To insure adherence to the spirit as well as the letter of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice, Congress created the United States Court of
Military Appeals 35 with final reviewing authority vested in that body
24 C.M.R. 253 (1957); United States v. Souder, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 59, 28 C.M.R. 283 (1959);
United States v. Kemp, 13 U.S.C.M.A. 89, 32 C.M.R. 89 (1962).
28. UCMJ art. 31 (a), 10 U.S.C. § 831 (a) (1964 ed.) "No person subject to this chap-
ter may compel any person to incriminate himself or to answer any question the answer
to which may tend to incriminate him."
29. UCMJ art. 31 (b), 10 U.S.C. § 831 (b) (1964 ed.) "No person subject to this
chapter may interrogate, or request any statement from, an accused or a person suspected
of an offense without first informing him of the nature of the accusation and advising
him that he does not have to make any statement regarding the offense of which he
is accused or suspected and that any statement made by him may be used as evidence
against him in a trial by court-martial." See also United States v. Kemp, 13 U.S.C.M.A.
89, 32 C.M.R. 89 (1962).
30. UCMJ art. .31 (d), 10 U.S.C. § 831 (d) (1964 ed.) "No statement obtained from
any person in violation of this article, or through the use of coercion, unlawful in-
fluence, or unlawful inducement may be received in evidence against him in a trial
by court.martial." See also United States v. Williams, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 430, 9 C.M.R. 60
(1953), United States v. Johnson, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 795, 19 C.M.R. 91 (1955).
31. UCMJ art. 98, 10 U.S.C. § 898 (1964 ed.) "Any person subject to this chapter
who-
(2) knowingly and intentionally fails to enforce or comply with any provision of this
chapter regulating the proceedings before, during, or after trial of an accused; shall be
punished as a court-martial may direct."
32. Exec. Order No. 10214, Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1951 hereafter
cited as MCM, 1951.
33. MCM, 1951, para. 140 a. "Confessions and admissions."; cf. MCM, 1951, para. 149
"Examination of Witnesses", and United States v. Howard, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 186, 17 C.M.R.
186 (1954).
34. MCM, 1951, para. 53 h. "Explanation of rights of accused."
35. UCMJ art. 67, 10 U.S.C. § 867 (1964 ed.) "Review by the Court of Military
Appeals."
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over all cases reviewed by the boards of review of the respective serv-
ices, except sentences of death or sentences which are imposed against
a general or a flag officer . Acting in its appellate capacity, the court
has closely monitored and often corrected the government's application
of Article 31 in all stages of the proceedings against an accused. In the
sixteen years of its existence, the court has handed down a series of de-
cisions on the issue of the right to counsel during the investigative stages
which have assured the accused of his right to remain silent 7 Al-
though the decisions have paralleled the holdings of the Supreme Court
in this area, they have been based explicitly on the intent of Congress
as that body has seen fit to enact legislation "for the Government and
Regulation of the land and naval forces." 38
MILITARY COUNSEL REQUIREMENTS PRIOR TO THE TEMPIA DECISION
The position of the Court of Military Appeals prior to Temnpia can
be summarized as follows: (1) It was not necessary for the govern-
ment to appoint counsel for the accused until charges had been filed
against him.' (2) Although not required to appoint counsel during a
preliminary investigation, the government could not deny the accused
the right to consult with counsel."4 (3) It was not necessary that coun-
sel be present with the accused during the interrogation, nor was it
necessary to inform the accused that he had the right to consult coun-
sel during the questioning in order to insure his right to remain silent.41
The reasoning of the court was made clear in United States v. Wim-
berly.4 Recognizing the holding in Escobedo v. Illinois,4 3 the court
stated that both Escobedo and the proper application of Article 31 were
designed, within their respective jurisdictional limits, to extend to the
accused the free exercise of his right to remain silent. Speaking for the
court, Chief Judge Quinn said:
This Court has always been alert to the accused's need for counsel
at all stages of the proceedings against him. We are not pursuaded,
36. UCMJ art. 67(b), 71(a) & (b); 10 U.S.C. §§ 867 (b), 871 (a) & (b) (1964 ed.)
37. See United States v. Clay, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 74, 1 C.M.R. 74 (1951); United States
v. Hernandez, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 465, 16 C.M.R. 39 (1954); United States v. Gunnels, 8
U.S.C.M.A. 130, 23 C.M.R. 354 (1957); United States v. Culp, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 199, 33
C.M.R. 411 (1963); United States v. Wimberly, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 3, 36 CM.R. 159 (1966).
38. U. S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
39. 8 U.S.C.MA. 130,23 C.M.R. 354 (1957).
40. 8 U.S.C.M.A. 441, 24 C.M.R. 251 (1957).
41. 16 U.S.C.M.A. 3, 36 C.M.R. 159 (1966).
42. id.
43. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
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however, that the right to counsel must be extended to include
the investigative process.... Nothing in the Uniform Code or in
the decisions of this Court, and nothing in our experience with
military methods of interrogation, indicates that the only feasible
way to give maximum effect to the Constitutional right to the
assistance of counsel is that the accused have counsel beside him
during police questioning-We adhere, therefore, to our previous
decision, and hold that an incriminating statement given by the
accused in a police interrogation, which meets the requirements of
Article 31, is admissible in evidence, even though the accused is not
informed he has the right to consult counsel during the question-
ing.44
It was with this precedential background that zl iranda v. Arizona4 5
made its entrance on the military scene. With its decision in Miranda
the Supreme Court brought the right to counsel during interrogation
within the ambit of constitutional due process.46 As stated by the Court
the presence of counsel is specifically required "to assure that the indi-
vidual's right to choose between silence and speech remains unfettered
throughout the interrogation process." 47 No longer does a cursory
warning by the police suffice to protect the prosecution from a later
charge that the accused has been denied his constitutional rights.4 In
answer to the obvious question of what would be an acceptable show-
ing of a clearly voluntary waiver of the accused's right of silence, the
Court dictated the so-called "Miranda formula." -9
44. 16 U.S.C.M.A. at 4, 36 C.M.R. at 160.
45. 384 U.S. 436.
46. "Accordingly, we hold that an individual held for interrogation must be clearly
informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with
him during interrogation under the system for protecting the privilege we delineate
today. As with the warnings of the right to remain silent and that anything stated
can be used in evidence against him, this warning is an absolute prerequisite to inter-
rogation." 384 U.S. at 471.
47. 384 U.S. at 469.
48. "If the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and a state-
ment is taken, a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the de-
fendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incriminiation
and his right to retained or appointed counsel." 384 U.S. at 475.
49. "Unless other fully effective means are adopted to notify the person of his right
of silence and to assure that the exercise of the right will be scrupulously honored, the
following measures are required. He must be warned prior to any questioning that he
has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court
of law, that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford
an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires."
384 U.S. at 479.
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It is significant to note that the Court did not suggest the formula
as the Alpha and Omega of adequate safeguard procedures; other pro-
cedures may be equally effective so long as the prosecution can show
that the procedure used serves not only to inform the accused of his
right to remain silent but also allows him to make continuing and effec-
tive use of this right.50
In anticipation of the same critical forecasts which followed the
Escobedo decision as to the ultimate debilitating effect which Miranda
would have on law enforcement, Chief Justice Warren stated:
There appears to have been no marked detrimental effect on crim-
inal law enforcement in these jurisdictions [having similar safe-
guards] as a result of these rules. Conditions of law enforcement
in our country are sufficiently similar to permit reference to this
experience as assurance that lawlessness will not result from warn-
ing an individual of his rights or allowing him to exercise them.51
Significantly, although it was discounted by the Court of Miitary Ap-
peals, one of "these jurisdictions" referred to by the Chief Justice was
the military establishment of the United States.5"
Therefore, at the time Tempia came before the Court of Military
Appeals the military safeguard procedure differed from that proposed
by the Supreme Court only to the extent that the military did not re-
quire as a prerequisite to the full exercise of the right to remain silent
that a lawyer be present at the examination of the accused.
EFFEc-rs OF THE TEMPIA DECISION
As a result of the decision in Tempia, the accused in an investigation
must be warned that he has the right to have counsel with him during
the investigation. This "counsel" must be a trained lawyer.3 Failure to
50. "It is impossible for us to foresee the potential alternatives for protecting the
privilege which might be devised by Congress or the States in the exercise of their
creative rule making capacities. Therefore we cannot say that the Constitution neces-
sarily requires adherence to any particular solution for the inherent compulsions of
the interrogation process as it is presently conducted." 384 U.S. at 467.
51. 384 U.S. at 489.
52. "Similarly, in our country the Uniform Code of Military Justice has long
provided that no suspect may be interrogated without first being warned of his right
not to make a statement and that any statement he makes may be used against him.
Denial of the right to consult counsel during interrogation has always been proscribed
by military tribunals." 384 U.S. at 489.
53. "Now, the accused must have a lawyer; before he need not have been given
one; now, he must be warned of his right to counsel; before, he need not be so
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comply with this procedure does not vitiate the government's case, but
it prohibits the government from using the accused's statements either
in an inculpatory or exculpatory sense, in support of a conviction . 4
By basing its decision on the constitutional safeguards applicable in
a civilian environment, the Court of Military Appeals is placed in the
anomolous position of compelling the government to provide trained
legal counsel during the interrogation of a suspect where there is the
possibility that the lawyer will be replaced by a layman for the trial.
While it is true that every accused before a general court-martial will
be defended by a lawyer qualified to practice before a federal court
or the highest court of a state, not every person accused of an offense
will be tried by a general court-martiaU5
A not so extreme example of this position can be illustrated as fol-
lows: An enlisted man suspected of participating in a riotO6 is taken
into custody for questioning. Prior to the actual interrogation he is as-
signed a lawyer and informed of his right of silence. Since it is possible
that the accused will be tried by a general court-martial, an Article 3257
investigation is initiated and again a lawyer represents the accused. If,
however, upon completion of the investigation, it appears that the
evidence will only support a conviction for breach of the peace,58 the
warned; and, now, finally, he will receive effective legal advice not only as to what he
can do, but also as to what he should do." 16 U.S.C.M.A. at 640, 37 C.M.R. at 260.
54. "Miranda does not specifically require such procedures or their equivalent to be
followed. It merely prohibits the receipt in evidence of any statement taken, unless
there is compliance with these constitutional standards. If the Government cannot
comply with them, it need only abandon its reliance in criminal cases on the accused's
statements as evidence." 16 U.S.C.M.A. at 639, 37 C.M.R. at 259.
55. Hearings on S. Res. 260 Before the Subcomrm. on Constitutional Rights of the
Senate Cormm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 2nd Sess., at 939 (1962). On the basis of
an Air Force study submitted in 1962 covering the years 1956-1960 inferior courts-
martial outnumbered general courts-martial roughly 25 to 1.
56. UCMJ art. 116, 10 U.S.C. § 916 (1964 ed.) "Riot or breach of peace. Any person
subject to this chapter who causes or participates in any riot or breach of the peace
shall be punished as a court-martial may direct."
57. UCMJ art. 32, 10 U.S.C. § 832 (1964 ed.) "Investigation, (a) No charge or
specification may be referred to a general court-martial for trial until a thorough and
impartial investigation of all the matters set forth therein has been made. This in-
vestigation shall include inquiry as to the truth of the matter set forth in the charges,
consideration of the form of charges, and a recommendation as to the disposition which
should be made of the case in the interest of justice and discipline.
(b) The accused shall be advised of the charges against him and of his right to be
represented at the investigation by counsel . .."
58. MCM, 1951, ch. 28, para. 195 b. This paragraph sets forth the elements of the
offense of riot and breach of the peace.
19681
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
convening authority may refer the case to trial by special court-martial.
Since this is an inferior court-martial, the government is required to
appoint trained legal counsel only if the case is prosecuted by a trained
lawyer.59 Suddenly the accused, who has been led to rely on the pro-
tection offered by a skilled professional who has been working with
that man's best interests in mind, finds the lawyer-client relationship dis-
solved and his defense placed in the hands of a layman. The aggressive
assertion by the lawyer of the man's right of silence is replaced by the
defensive shielding of the accused from whatever basic unfairness the
officer can anticipate or detect. While it is true that the sentence is less
than the defendant could have received from a general court-martial, it
is doubtful whether the prisoner will appreciate his good fortune while
serving his six months confinement.0
The decision by the Court of Military Appeals in Tempia without
a doubt was designed to assure the free exercise of the right of the ac-
cused to remain silent at a crucial period in the proceedings against him.
But how effective is this protection when it can be taken away during
the preparation for trial? If we must assume that military officers with-
out formal legal training cannot assure the free and continued exercise
of the right of silence during the interrogation, it necessarily must fol-
low that these officers should not be expected to guard this same right
at a later state of an adversary proceeding. The proper implementation
of the spirit as well as the letter of Tempia requires a uniform appli-
cation of the decision not only at all stages of the adversary proceeding
but also in all adversary proceedings which may result in a judicial de-
termination of guilt or innocence. The right to remain silent is placed
in no less jeopardy when a serviceman appears before a special court-
martial than when he appears before a general court-martial. If, to en-
sure the continued protection of the right of silence, it is necessary to
require the presence of trained legal counsel throughout the preparation
for trial by general court-martial, then it likewise is essential to ensure
the presence of the same protective influence for a serviceman facing
a special court-martial.
The Court of Military Appeals indicated in the present decision that
the services of the military lawyer can be augmented by civilian coun-
sel retained at the expense of the government in the event of the non-
availability of trained military counsel.6 ' Such an idea has limited ap-
59. UCMJ art. 27, 10 U.S.C. § 827 (1964 ed.).
60. MCM, 1951, ch. 25, sec. A at 223. "Table of Maximum Punishments."
61. 16 U.S.C.M.A at 638, 37 C.M.R. at 258.
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plication for it ignores the realities of military life. While many large
military bases are located near large population centers in the United
States where civilian counsel is available, the nation's present military
posture requires large segments of the military establishment to be com-
mitted overseas. If military units operating in combat zones, aboard
ship or in isolated areas of the nation's defense perimeter do not have
trained legal counsel as part of their military organization they will do
without trained legal counsel. If it may be assumed that the number
of military attorneys is presently adequate for the proper administration
of military justice and that as the result of Tempia the workload of
these attorneys will increase,u it follows that the requirements laid down
by the present case, without more, may have a detrimental effect on
the military justice system. Either the present number of lawyers will
bear the increased workload, which may result in spreading the legal
branches of the services too thin, or there will be an increase in the
number of acts which warrant punishment but, due to the non-avail-
ability of legal counsel, are dismissed. While not all convictions need be
based on confessions of the accused, the burden of proof which the gov-
ernment must carry to show the continuous exercise by the accused
of his right to silence may be so great as to demand the presence of an
attorney during preparation for trial to ensure that the conviction will
not be overruled.Ya
CONCLUSION
In effect, the Court of Military Appeals has established a standard
for the proper administration of military justice which it is powerless
to implement. Not only is Congress the source of the military justice
system" but it also remains the source of the funds on which the system
depends for its effective operation. If the court meant to point the way
62. Supra note 55.
63. "If the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and a statement
is taken, a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant
knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right
to retained or appointed counsel." 16 USCMA at 638, 37 CMR at 258 quoting Miranda
at 475. Also, "The correct principle requires proof by the United States of the proper
warning as to the accused's right to remain silent and to a lawyer, as the predicate for
the use of any pretrial statement, obtained during custodial interrogation, whether it
be inculpatory or exculpatory, or used on the merits or merely to impeach the ac-
cused. It is apparent that the Government did not, on this record, show such com-
pliance. Reversible error." United States v. Lincoln 17 U.S.C.M.A. 330, 38 C.M.R. 128
(1967).
64. U.S. CON5T. art. 1, § 8.
1968]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [
for congressional re-evaluation of the application of constitutional safe-
guards to the military, then alternative means of protecting the right of
an accused to remain silent within the traditional concept of "military
counsel" should have been left open. While this would have required
evaluation of each conviction as it was appealed, such a system would
have had the advantage of encouraging meaningful alternatives to the
requirement of a trained lawyer present at each interrogation. If it
were apparent that abuse of the individual's right of silence continued,
then the present requirements could have been established as part of a
uniform and comprehensive plan by the Congress."a While the present
decision is reduced by the contemporary circumstances and a disregard
for the realities of military life to an example of judicial legislation 6
with all of the limitations inherent in that term, organized and com-
prehensive legislation to the same effect would have achieved a smooth
transition from one procedure to another while recognizing the author-
ity and ultimate responsibility of Congress for the proper administration
of military justice.
Gilbert A. Bartlett
65. That Congress is not unmindful of its responsibilities in this area is attested to by
the continuous revisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice up through 10 US.C.
(Supp. II, 1965-66). UCMJ art. 67 (g), 10 U.S.C. § 867 (g) (1964 ed.) requires the
Court of Military Appeals to submit to the Congress an annual report containing
"recommendations relating to uniformity of policies as to sentences, amendments to this
chapter, and any other matters considered appropriate."
66. See dissenting opinion of Chief Judge Quinn, 16 U.S.C.M.A. at 644, 37 C.M.R. at
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